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Abstract
Estimates of a prepayment function for multifamily mortgages are reported in this paper.
These are among the first attempts to estimate such a function; most previous work along these
lines focuses on single family mortgages. A further distinguishing aspect of the paper is its
attempt to incorporate the impact of unobservable factors on the mortgage refinancing decision.
A variant of the maximum likelihood procedure first developed by Meyer (1987) is employed.
The results indicate an overall positive duration dependence for the conditional prepayment rate.
The estimated response of prepayments to a change in the market rate of interest is significant
with the expected sign; it is also larger once the effect of unobserved heterogeneity is taken into
account. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the response is substantially less than that predicted by
the ruthless option pricing model.

Ruthless Prepayment? Evidence from
Multifamily Mortgages
Introduction
The large growth in the market for mortgage-backed securities in the past decade or so
has led to substantial research designed to value or price these securities. One theoretical
approach uses the option pricing model (OPM) developed in the field of financial economics. In
this model, mortgage borrowers have an option to prepay their mortgages today or at any time in
the future and prior to the maturity of the mortgage. This option has value to the borrower as
long as there is some possibility that future interest rates may decline below their contract rates.
If this occurs, the borrowers may reduce their mortgage payments by refinancing their mortgages
at the new and lower market mortgage interest rates. Measuring the value of the prepayment or
call option owned by the borrower is critical to the valuation of mortgage-backed securities; the
larger is the value of the option, the lower is the value of the mortgage-backed security.
The option pricing model has yielded numerous insights regarding the pricing of
mortgage-backed securities. However, the theoretical predictions of the option pricing model do
not appear to hold empirically. The most important shortcoming among data on single family
mortgages seems to be that the interest rate sensitivity of the conditional prepayment rate is less
than that predicted by the pure option pricing model. Quigley and Van Order (1990), Follain,
Scott, and Yang (1992) and others present evidence along these lines and suggest that most
homeowners do not “ruthlessly” make their refinancing decision; Vandell (1995) discusses the
same issue regarding mortgage default.
Several explanations can be offered to explain why the OPM may not apply exactly to
single family mortgages. First, owner-occupants may not be as financially sophisticated as the
pure OPM implies. Alternatively stated, these households may face substantial transactions costs

in their refinancing decisions because it requires much time and energy to make the correct
decision given their lack of financial sophistication. Second, prepayment by homeowners is
influenced by many other decisions that make it difficult to identify clearly the effects of the OPM.
For example, households often prepay because the locations of their jobs change or because of
major changes in family composition such as a divorce. Third, prepayment may occur as part of
an overall desire to adjust the composition of one’s portfolio. For example, a person may choose
to refinance in order to increase his or her loan to value ratio and use the proceeds of the
refinancing to make other investments. Fourth, the data available to estimate prepayment studies
may constitute part of the problem. In particular, the interest rate patterns of the past 15 years
may not contain enough volatility to measure with much precision their effects on prepayment.
This paper continues the investigation of the applicability of the OPM to mortgages.
Attention is focused on the prepayment of multifamily mortgages. Little econometric work is
available about these mortgages, yet the market for multifamily MBSs has grown considerably in
recent years and has the potential for much more growth, e.g., DiPasquale and Cummings (1992),
Follain and Szymanoski (1995), and Godner and Rosen (1989). Multifamily mortgages also offer
an opportunity to study the OPM in an environment in which its assumptions are more suitable.
Presumably, holders of multifamily mortgage are likely to be more financially sophisticated than
those who do not have the wealth needed to make such investments. This is probably particularly
true for the sample examined in this paper— 1,083 Freddie Mac Plan A multifamily mortgages
originated between 1975 and 1986— because the mortgages are, on average, quite large. In
addition, investors in these properties are less likely to prepay for non-financial reasons. For
example, a job change or a family change does not force a landlord to dispose of his or her rental
property.
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The econometric investigation focuses on the estimation of the conditional probability of
prepaying a mortgage in a particular quarter, which is referred to as the quarterly conditional
prepayment rate (CPR) for multifamily mortgages. The CPR is an essential ingredient in modern
option pricing models of mortgages. In these models, the price of the mortgage can be derived as
the present value of a stream of future mortgage payments discounted at a risk-adjusted discount
rate. What makes the pricing of mortgages more complex than the pricing of the standard
noncallable bond is the possibility that the streams may terminate prior to the maturity of the loan
because the borrower chooses to refinance. As a consequence, accurate mortgage valuation
requires an understanding of the time pattern of the stream of future mortgage payments and, in
particular, its sensitivity to changes in the market rate of interest. This requires knowledge of the
survivor function of the mortgage or, equivalently, the hazard rate. Kau and Keenan (1995)
recently reviewed the large literature on option pricing models of mortgages and discussed the
role of the CPR in mortgage pricing.
In this study, a semiparametric estimation technique is used to analyze the determinants of
the conditional prepayment rate or the prepayment hazard rate. The technique is semiparametric
because the (log-integrated) baseline hazard is estimated completely nonparametrically and
simultaneously with the covariate coefficients in a proportional hazard model. It represents the
extension of the technique of Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) that was introduced into the
econometrics literature by Meyer (1987). One of its principal advantages over competing
semiparametric estimation techniques, for example those of Cox (1975) and Moffitt (1985), is that
it easily allows the introduction of mortgage-specific unobserved heterogeneity. In essence, each
borrower is assigned an error term that explicitly incorporates controls for his unobserved
characteristics. This error term is then integrated out of the likelihood contribution of each
borrower to leave the marginal density (or survivor function) of the time to prepayment.
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Incorporation of unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers is expected to account, at least
partially, for the wide variety of unobserved factors that affect prepayment; in so doing, it is
expected that the responsiveness of the hazard with respect to interest rate changes will be
estimated more accurately.
The key results of the analysis are:

Prepayment is found to be sensitive to the value of the call option and, hence, the
difference between the contract rate and the current market rate. Also, the
responsiveness of the conditional prepayment rate to the value of the option is
sensitive to whether the option is in or out of the money and the extent to which the
option is in the money, as the theory suggests. However, the responsiveness of
prepayment with respect to an interest rate change for an in-the-money option is still
short of what is expected in the pure OPM.
The estimates of the time-varying parameters suggest that conditional prepayment
rates increase with the length of time that the mortgage has been held (positive
duration dependence). Furthermore, these parameters are particularly large around 50
quarters after origination.
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity among the investors does improve the results
substantially. Most notably, the heterogeneity variance is statistically significant and
the estimates of the coefficients of the option variables are larger in the model with
heterogeneity than in the model without it.

The remainder of the paper includes five additional sections. The estimation techniques
are discussed, followed by an explanation of the specification of covariates and the data
employed. The results are the presented. The final section discusses the implications of the
analysis regarding the OPM and offers some suggestions for further work.

The Estimation Technique
Each observation in our original sample describes a single mortgage securitized by Freddie
Mac and originating between 1975 and 1986 and followed through the first quarter of 1989. Our
goal is to find the determinants of the conditional prepayment rate (prepayment hazard rate) for
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these mortgages, in other words, the rate of prepayment at a given mortgage age for all
mortgages that reach that age. We do not have information on the mortgagee or lending
institution that would allow us to model correlations across observations for mortgage age at
prepayment, the random variable of interest. Accordingly, we consider mortgage ages at
prepayment to be statistically independent in our sample.
As a starting point for our statistical analysis, letTi be the age of mortgage i at
prepayment. The prepayment hazard rate, i(t) for mortgage i at time t is defined as:
i(t)

lim (Prob [t
t

0

t > Ti

t Ti

t])/

t .

(1)

The prepayment hazard is assumed to take on the proportional hazard form used by Cox (1972):
i(t)

where

0(t)

0(t)

exp zi(t)

,

(2)

is the unknown baseline hazard at timet, zi(t) is the vector of time dependent

covariates that influence the prepayment decision for mortgagei at time t and

is the parameter

vector to be estimated.
Cox (1975) developed a partial likelihood technique to estimate the parameter vector of
his proportional hazard. The partial likelihood technique suffers from at least two shortcomings.
First, the correct treatment of tied failure times within the partial likelihood approach is difficult
both theoretically and computationally. Second, the incorporation of individual-specific
unobserved heterogeneity makes the estimation virtually intractable.
These two deficiencies are resolved in Meyer’s (1987) adaptation of the Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978) technique. In Meyer’s approach, the parameters of the (log-integrated) baseline
hazard are estimated nonparametrically and simultaneously with the parameter vector of the
proportional hazard. The estimation does not use the continuous quality of the variable mortgage
age at prepayment; rather, it discretizes this variable into time intervals. Because a parameter
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must be estimated for each such time interval, we took the intervals to be quarters. This left us
with 55 parameters to estimate in the baseline hazard.1
The conditional survivor function at aget + 1 is defined to be the probability that
mortgage age at prepayment is greater than or equal to the quarter ending at time t + 1 given that
the mortgage age at prepayment is greater than or equal to the quarter ending at time t:
P [ Ti

t

1 Ti

t]

t 1

exp
t

exp

i

(u) du
(3)

exp (zi (t)

t 1

)
t

0 (u) du

,

where zi(t) is assumed constant in the quarter starting at t and ending at t + 1. Equation (3) can
also be written as:
P [ Ti

t

1 Ti

t]

exp [

exp (z i (t)

(t) ) ] ,

(4)

where
(t)

t 1

ln [
t

0 (u) du

] .

(5)

Our estimation must properly take into account the possibility that some mortgages will
not have prepaid in the period in which they are observed. This can happen in one of two ways.
First, the mortgage may be observed over only part of its term. Second, the mortgage may simply
mature. Following Meyer (1990), we take care of the possibility of censoring by denoting the
appropriate censoring time for each observation as Ci and defining

i

1 if Ti

otherwise. Furthermore, we define ki = min(int(Ti), Ci).
The likelihood function for a sample ofN mortgages can be written as:
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Ci and 0

N

l( , )

[1

exp

exp[ (ki )

i 1

zi (k i )

] ]

i

(6)
ki 1

exp

exp[ (t)

t 0

where

[ (0),..., (55)] and

zi (t)

]

,

are the parameters to be estimated. Note that the first term in

the product in (6) is equal to 1 and so provides no information to the likelihood except when a
spell ends between ki and ki + 1. The final product in (6) is simply the probability that the
mortgage lasts at least until ki. The log-likelihood function associated with equation (6) is:
N

L( , )

[

i

log [ 1

exp

exp [ (ki )

zi (ki )

]

i 1

(7)

ki 1

exp [ (t)

zi (t)

]] .

t 0

We move now to the case where unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated into the
analysis. Realistically, we recognize that we will never have a situation in which all relevant
covariates are included inzi(t). We incorporate the effects of all excluded regressors that are
constant over the life of the mortgage into the random variable i, which is a mortgage-specific
error term. The new hazard becomes:
i(t)

i

0(t)

exp zi (t)

The random variable

i

.

(8)

is assumed to be distributed independently of the zi(t) and has a

Gamma distribution with mean one and variance 2. Conditioning on the unobserved

i

and

integrating out over their distribution leads to the following log-likelihood, derived by Meyer
(1990):
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ki 1

N

L( , ,

2

)

log [[ 1

2

i 1

exp[ (ki )

zi(ki)

]]

2

t 0

(9)
ki
i

[1

2

exp [ (t)

z i (t)

]]

2

] .

t 0

Here, the variance parameter

2

must be estimated together with the parameter vectors

and .

The estimation of the log-likelihood in equations (7) and (9) was performed on a Sun
Workstation (Release 4.1.3) and an IBM AIX Workstation (Release 3.2.5) at Syracuse
University using the optimization program GQOPT, version 6.

Specification of Covariates
The selection of the regressors in the covariate vector of the Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer
hazard analysis is motivated by option pricing theory. The following discussion highlights some
of the major insights generated by the option pricing model and their implications for the
specification and estimation of the econometric model.2
According to the option pricing model , the market value of an existing mortgage, P(t),
can be written as the difference of two components: P(t)

Pnc(t)

Vc(t) . The first term, Pnc(t),

is the present value of all future mortgage payments until maturity discounted at the current
interest rate. The second term, Vc(t), is the value to the mortgagee of not currently exercising the
prepayment or call option, usually referred to simply as the value of the call option. The value of
the prepayment option is nonnegative because any lender must be compensated for the
uncertainty created by allowing the option to be embedded in a mortgage .
With this as background the criterion for the refinancing and the specification of our
econometric model can be described precisely. A borrower will refinance if

-8-

P(t)
where P(t)

B(t) > TC(t) ,

(10)

B(t) is the difference between the market value and the book value of the

outstanding loan balance. TC(t) represents transactions costs associated with refinancing. In
words, a borrower refinances if the market value of its existing mortgage exceeds the book value
of the debt plus incidental transactions costs. WritingP(t) in terms of the value of the call option
and rearranging terms shows that prepayment is appropriate if Pnc(t)

B(t) exceeds the sum

Vc(t) + TC(t).
These considerations lead to the following specification of the primary covariate,
EXOPT(t), the reward or value to the mortgagee of exercising the prepayment option
immediately, measured as a percentage of book value:
EXOPT(t)

[P(t) B(t) TC(t)] / B(t) .

(11)

If EXOPT(t) is positive, the call option is in the money and the borrower will benefit financially by
prepaying the loan prior to maturity and obtaining a new loan at the market rate of interest. If
EXOPT(t) is negative, exercising the prepayment option immediately bears a cost (the call option
is out of the money).
This option based view of the refinancing criterion also sheds light on the shape of the
functional relationship between the criterion and the hazard. Not only is the prepayment hazard
positively related to EXOPT(t), but the relationship between the two is expected to be nonlinear.
The the value of the call option is likely to be quite small when the market interest rate is well
above the contract interest rate (coupon rate) because the likelihood of benefiting from
refinancing in the future is small. The prepayment option is likely to rise in value substantially as
the market rate approaches and falls below the coupon rate because such movements increase the
likelihood that the borrower may be able to realize savings in the future by refinancing. Although
the exact shape of the function depends upon the volatility of interest rates and the term to
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maturity, this reasoning does suggest a highly nonlinear shape to the hazard. It is relatively flat
and insensitive to changes inEXOPT when EXOPT is negative and the market rate of interest far
exceeds the borrower’s contract rate, i.e., the prepayment option is deeply out of the money. The
hazard rises as the market rate approaches the contract rate (from above)and increases
substantially whenEXOPT is large and positive, i.e., the option is deeply in the money. In fact,
according to the ruthless version of the option pricing model in which the prepayment is driven
purely by this financial criterion, the hazard rate ought to approach unity when the option is
deeply in the money.
Although the data set does not provide information about the book value of the
outstanding mortgage, its computation is straightforward given knowledge of the term to
maturity, T, the coupon rate, rc, and the origination date, which are available. The book value can
be written as:
B(t)

(M/rc) (1

(1

rc)

(T t)

),

(12)

where M represents the quarterly mortgage payment.
Computation of the market value of the debt represents a more challenging problem.
Ideally, the market value of the debt should be calculated using an explicit option pricing model to
compute Vc(t) for each mortgage and for each quarter; this is an impractical approach in empirical
work of this type. The simpler approach used in this paper relies on the contention of Richard
and Roll (1989) that states that the market value of a callable bond is approximated by the present
value of the payments to maturity discounted by the current callable interest rate.3 As long as the
current market rate used to compute the present value pertains to a new issue with a maturity
close to the remaining term of the existing mortgage, this approach will provide relatively
accurate estimates of market value. Thus, the expression for the value of a callable bond used
here is:
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P(t)

(M/r(t)) (1

(1

r(t))

(T t)

(13)

),

where r(t) is the current rate on newly issued mortgages.
The final component of the primary criterion for prepayment is transactions costs,TC(t).
Transactions costs have two main components. The first is the penalty for prepayment, which is 6
months of interest within the first five years and one percent of the book balance after that. The
second is the sum of the various and incidental transactions costs associated with the origination
of a new mortgage. These include the cost of appraisal, application fees, and origination fees on
the first mortgage; they do not include payments to buy down the interest rate on the new
mortgage. One might also include less precise aspects of these costs such as the value of the time
spent thinking about the issue. This second component can also be divided into an absolute dollar
amount and a percentage of the book balance. We use $1,000 as the estimate of the absolute
costs of refinancing and one percent of book value as the variable component. Furthermore, our
expectation is that the unobservable and idiosyncratic portion of transactions costs are captured to
some extent by the model in which unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.
The possibility of a nonlinear response of the hazard toEXOPT is examined by the use of
a piecewise linear spline function. Experimentation led to the specification of four pieces: in the
positive direction the first piece is forEXOPT between 0 and 0.1 and the second piece is for
EXOPT greater than 0.1; in the negative direction the first piece is forEXOPT between 0 and -0.1
and the second piece is for EXOPT less than -0.1. The size of the coefficients ofEXOPT are
expected to increase as EXOPT increases. The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity is also
expected to increase the size of the coefficients ofEXOPT, since the unobservable components of
transactions costs may be better taken into account.
Option pricing theory also suggests another covariate, the value of the equity that exists in
the property. Holders of existing mortgages also implicitly own an option to default if the market
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value of the property falls below the market value of the mortgage. Because the option to default
is surrendered upon prepayment, it is an opportunity cost associated with prepayment. As such,
the larger the value of the default option, the lower is the likelihood that the mortgage will be
prepaid in order to refinance if the conditions for refinancing are otherwise satisfied. As with the
prepayment option, it is not possible to incorporate an exact measure of the default option;
instead, we use the loan to value ratio as a proxy for this option. The larger the loan to value
ratio, the greater is the likelihood of default and the greater is the value of the default option.
The market value of the property is the original appraisal value increased by a statespecific index of single family housing prices; that is,
H(t)

H(0) (1

)t ,

(14)

where H(0) and H(t) represent original and current collateral values, respectively, and is the
average quarterly growth rate in housing values for the state in which the mortgage originated.4
The loan to value ratio, B(t)/H(t), might be included in the hazard as a single variable; however,
because of the likely inexactness of this measure of current collateral value, the variablesH(t) and
B(t) appear separately and in natural logarithms. Moreover, these variables are entered as
covariates only when the prepayment is in the money, i.e.,EXOPT > 0. With an exact collateral
measure, the theory suggests that these coefficients will have the same magnitude and opposite
signs, with the coefficient for the logarithm ofH(t) positive.
Several other dummy variables are included to control for possible seasonal effects.
Analysts of single family prepayments have identified seasonal effects in their analysis. Fabozzi
and Modigliani (1992) find that conditional prepayment rates are lowest in the winter months and
begin to rise in the spring, reaching a peak in the summer months or early fall. This pattern
probably reflects the greater propensity for homeowners to sell their homes during the spring and
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summer and move during the summer months. We test whether similar effects for multifamily
investors exist.
The last covariate is also a dummy variable and pertains to the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA). Several provisions of the TRA provided incentives for many owners of existing
multifamily real estate projects to sell before the end of 1986. In particular, the TRA called for a
higher capital gains tax rate and much longer depreciation periods than previous law. It is
possible that these provisions triggered above average property sales and, hence, above average
conditional prepayment rates, during the last quarter of 1986. This effect is captured by entering
a dummy variable for that quarter.

Data Description
This section provides a description of the data set comprised of non-assumable, fully
amortizing (plan A) loans provided by Freddie Mac. Sample inclusion required that, on the date
of sample collection (April 27, 1989), the loan was active, prepaid, or foreclosed, delinquent, or
real-estate owned (REO). Loans which had implausible loan to value ratios, missing values for
principal amount, appraisal value, contract rate at origination, or maturity date, or were recorded
as paid off but had no payoff date were also deleted. Active loans are considered to be censored
in the estimation in that they were still current at the date of sample collection. Loans that were
foreclosed, delinquent, or REO are treated as being censored in the final quarter that they were
active. Thus, instead of being dropped entirely from the estimation sample, each mortgagequarter for these loans during the period in which they remain current provides a contribution to
the likelihood function.
Since each quarter in the sample has a baseline hazard parameter associated with it, for
tractability in the estimation procedure the loan sample was further restricted to loans originating
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after 1974 and before 1987, which marks the beginning of the post-TRA regime. Of the 1,083
sample mortgages, there were 451 that eventually prepaid in the sample period, and 632 that were
censored, usually because the mortgage had not yet reached maturity at the end of the sample
period. Less than 20 were censored due to mortgage default.
There appears to have been a sharp acceleration in originations in the mid-1970s. More
than half the sample, 607 loans to be precise, originated in the two-year period 1975-76. A
breakdown of mortgage characteristics by origination year is presented in Table 1. There was an
increase in loan size and the value of the property being financed after 1982. Interest rates at
origination have ranged from a low of 9.43 percent in 1976 to a high of 14.87 percent in 1982.
Originations were lower in the 1980s than the 1970s because of the high rates in the early 1980s
and because Freddie Mac moved to another multifamily program during the 1980s.5
A calculation of the empirical (Kaplan-Meier) quarterly hazard for the sample of loans
shows that the hazard does not reach 1 percent until the 10th quarter of the loan and first reaches
3 percent in the 41st quarter. Thereafter, it does not fall below 2 percent. An examination of the
sample prepayment pattern by calendar time shows no prepayments before the first quarter of
1984, when the average mortgage rate on newly issued multifamily loans purchased and
securitized by Freddie Mac stood at 13.28 percent, down from a high of 17.77 percent in the first
quarter of 1982. The maximal prepayment rate of 4.67 percent occurred in the first quarter of
1987, when the average mortgage rate bottomed out at 9.97 percent. In the first quarter of 1989,
the final sample calendar quarter, the prepayment rate was 2.81 percent and the average mortgage
rate was 11.06 percent.
The housing value appreciation index is calculated from time-series and cross-sectional
observations on median sales prices of a single family home, constructed by WEFA/DRI. A price
appreciation factor for each state and quarter is computed which in turn is used to calculate the
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contemporaneous value of the property by multiplying the appraisal value by this appreciation
factor.

Results
The discussion of the results is divided into two parts. The first subsection focuses on the
process by which we arrived at the final specification of covariates for two models, with and
without heterogeneity. The parameter estimates and predictive ability of the models are also
compared. The second subsection examines the sensitivity of prepayment rates to changes in
EXOPT implied by the model estimates and, in particular, whether the results are consistent with
the “ruthless” option pricing model.
Arriving at the Two Final Models
Maximum likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors for five different covariate
specifications are presented in Tables 2-6 for models with and without unobserved heterogeneity.
For each of the estimations there are estimates for 56 (log-integrated) baseline hazard parameters,
(0) through (55), where (t-1) is the parameter for period t. Because there were no
prepayments of a mortgage in quarter 25, (24) could not be estimated independently and we
imposed the restriction:
(24)

( (23)

(25))/2.

(15)

Thus, 55 independent baseline hazard parameter estimates were generated in each estimation.
(We present estimates only for quarters 1, 19, 37, and 56.) All of the estimations also contain
three seasonal indicators for spring, summer, and fall; the indicator for winter is subsumed in the
’s. They also contain an indicator for the fourth quarter of 1986, in which conditional
prepayment rates were hypothesized to be higher as a result of the TRA of 1986. The (evenly
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numbered) models controlling for unobserved heterogeneity also generate an estimate for 2, the
variance of the Gamma-distributed random effect.
The five specifications differ only in the set of financial variables that are included. In the
specification of Table 2, the only financial variable included isEXOPT, the value of exercising the
prepayment option currently. In the Table 3 specification, only an indicator for whetherEXOPT
is positive (in the money) is included. For Table 4, four variables representing the spline
discussed in Section III are included. For contrast with Table 4, Table 5 includes indicator
variables representing three of the four pieces of the spline; the indicator forEXOPT < -.1 is
subsumed in the ’s. Finally, in the preferred specification of Table 6, the financial variables
consist of those in the four-piece spline and the logarithms of housing value and book value.
The results in Table 2-6 for the models without heterogeneity indicate an overall
increasing pattern for the (t)’s, so that duration dependence is generally positive. The (t)’s
increase even faster in the corresponding models with heterogeneity. Such a downward bias of
duration dependence in the absence of heterogeneity controls was first noted by Lancaster (1976)
in his work on unemployment durations. It is demonstrated in Figure 1, which plots quarterly
hazard rates for representative values of the covariates for the models with and without
heterogeneity in the preferred specification.6 For, both models, we calculate the quarterly hazard
rate as
hi (t)

1

exp

exp [ (t)

zi (t)

] .

(16)

The interpretation is straightforward in the model without heterogeneity; in the model with
heterogeneity it represents the quarterly hazard of a mortgage for which the heterogeneity
component equals the mean value of unity.
Moving now to an examination of the covariates, we see first that the seasonal effects for
spring and fall are always insignificantly different than the effect for winter. However, except for
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Models III and IV in Table 3, the effect of summer is to significantly lower the hazard from winter
quarters (at the 5 percent level). These results contrast with those found by Fabozzi and
Modigliani (1992) for single family mortgages. A less striking seasonal pattern for multifamily
prepayments is not too surprising, because prepayments due to borrower relocation are probably
much less important in the multifamily case.
The coefficient of the dummy variable for the last quarter of 1986 is positive in all models,
but significant at the 5 percent level in only three of the ten models. In each model in which it was
significant, the prepayment option variable(s) were indicators. In all specifications the effect of
this quarter diminished in the model with heterogeneity. The results suggest that prepayments
were not higher than normal during this period— investors did not seek to sell their properties to
those who wished to benefit from the more generous depreciation of benefits of the law prior to
TRA.
Perhaps the covariates of most interest in our model are those associated with the exercise
of the prepayment option. In all models, the associated coefficient estimates have the expected
sign and virtually all are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The two
exceptions are the coefficient for the spline whenEXOPT is between -0.1 and 0.0 in the models
without heterogeneity in Tables 4 and 6. Of these two, the estimate is significant at the 5 percent
level only in Table 4. Comparing models without heterogeneity to models with heterogeneity, the
estimated effect of a covariate relating to EXOPT is higher in the corresponding heterogeneity
model for all estimates but one, the spline estimate forEXOPT between 0.0 and 0.1 in Table 6.
We suspect that this is because the heterogeneity model is able to control for an unobserved
component of transactions costs. It is also interesting to note, by a simple comparison of loglikelihoods, that over the four preliminary specifications, the specifications that used exact
quantitative information on EXOPT (Tables 2 and 4) performed better than the corresponding
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specifications which used only qualitative information onEXOPT (Tables 3 and 5 respectively).
Finally, in Tables 4 and 6, it is interesting to note the heightened effect of an increase inEXOPT
when it is just in the money compared to when it is just out of the money. This point is examined
in more detail below.
For the preferred specification (Table 6), the estimated coefficients for the logarithms of
housing and book values have the expected sign in both models, but only one of these four
estimates (housing value in the model with heterogeneity) is individually significant at the 5
percent level. However, a likelihood ratio test (comparing Models VI and X) suggests joint
significance at the 1 percent level— the 2-statistic has two degrees of freedom and a value of
11.63 (the critical value at the 1 percent level is 9.21). The fact that our analysis uses a single
family housing price index instead of a multifamily housing price index is a possible explanation
for our less than satisfactory results. Nonetheless, the results do indicate the potential importance
of incorporating the value of the default option.
For three of the five specifications (Tables 2, 4, and 6), there are marked differences in the
parameter estimates across models with and without heterogeneity. (The fact that estimates of

2

are substantially smaller in Tables 3 and 5 is likely an artifact of there being no continuous
variables in the specification.) Still, it is problematic, for any one specification, to conclude which
of the two models is the correct one. Score tests for unobserved heterogeneity that do not
assume a specific form for the heterogeneity distribution may give misleading results when a large
proportion of the data are censored (see, for example, Horowitz and Neumann (1989)). If we do
assume a specific distribution for heterogeneity (the Gamma in our case), simple Wald and
likelihood ratio tests for whether the variance of the heterogeneity component is different from
zero are not, strictly speaking, valid because zero is a boundary value for the set of possible
values of the variance.
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Gouriéroux, Holly and Montfort (1982) show that the appropriate critical value for a test
of size

is the critical value for a test of size 2 under standard conditions (see also Chernoff

(1954)). Thus, for a test of size .01, the critical

2

(1) value is 5.41. For the preferred

specification (Table 6), the value of the Wald 2-statistic is 7.41 while for the likelihood ratio it is
14.41. Thus both tests reject the null in favor of the alternative at the 1 percent level.
Some Implications of the Results
A central question addressed in this paper is whether the prepayment behavior of
multifamily mortgages performs similarly to that predicted by the standard or ruthless option
pricing model. Several predictions emerge from the theoretical option pricing model. The
prepayment rate is relatively insensitive to interest rate changes as long as the value of exercising
the option is negative. The predicted hazard rate should also rise relatively rapidly and nonlinearly
as the value of exercising the option becomes positive and increases in value. Lastly, the
probability of prepayment is expected to be near unity when the value of the call option is deeply
in the money.
An examination of these predictions requires an examination of the shape of the hazard
function for different values ofEXOPT. For this examination we use the aggregate quarterly
hazard rate, which is based on the marginal density and survivor function of the duration, i.e.,
aggregating over the effect of heterogeneity. The formula for the aggregate quarterly hazard at
quarter t in the model with no heterogeneity can be obtained from equation (4) in a
straightforward manner:
hi (t)

1

exp

exp [ (t)

zi (t)

] .

(17)

In the model with heterogeneity, the aggregate quarterly hazard has the form:

hi (t)

2

1

1
1

2

gi (t)

gi (t

2

(18)

1)
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where
t

gi (t)

exp( (t)

zi (t)

)

(19)

s 0

and gi ( 1) 0. The values assigned to the covariates are zero except for EXOPT which is
allowed to change in value and the time period is fixed at the second quarter since origination.
Several points emerge from an examination of this particular hazard function, which is
plotted in Figure 2. First, the model with heterogeneity yields systematically higher hazard rates
than the model without heterogeneity. Second, the function is insensitive to reductions in the
market rate of interest (increases in EXOPT) if the value of exercising the option is negative.
Third, the function rises steeply and nonlinearly withEXOPT when it is positive (in the money).
Fourth, and most importantly, the quarterly hazard rate never approaches unity even when the
option is deeply in the money. The second and third results are consistent with the option pricing
model, but the last result is not. Although this is only one of many different hazard functions that
can be graphed, it is based upon representative and reasonable values of the covariates. Some
experimentation with other values and other time periods generated similar results.
The upshot of these results is that multifamily borrowers do not follow the ruthless pricing
model. Although prepayment rates do increase nonlinearly when the value of exercising the
option is positive, they do not rise to unity even when the option is deeply in the money. This
result holds even when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. As such, these results are
consistent with the results of Quigley and Van Order (1990) regarding the applicability of the
ruthless pricing model to single family mortgages.
The results also shed light on the value of a parameter often used to make simple
calculations of the price of a mortgage— the expected holding period of the borrower. This simple
way of computing the value of a mortgage computes the present value of remaining mortgage
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payments for a typical or average expected holding period. The estimates of the baseline
components of the hazard function can be used to determine this average holding period by
plotting the survivor function for typical values of the covariates. This is done for the marginal
survivor function (integrating out the heterogeneity component) in Figure 3 using covariate values
of zero. For this particular plot, the survival rate for the model with heterogeneity equals 50
percent at about 8.5 years or 34 quarters; the median holding period is calculated to be at least
four quarters longer for the model without heterogeneity. An average holding period of eight to
ten years is consistent with the results recently reported by Bogdon and Follain (1995), who
report an average holding period of about ten years for a recent national sample of multifamily
properties.
Of course, using a rule of thumb such as this to compute the value of a mortgage is less
precise than one that fully incorporates the estimated hazard rate. Although the development of
such a complete model is beyond the scope of this paper, it is a fruitful area for future research.
Therefore, it may be useful to summarize briefly the steps needed to produce one type of pricing
model. First, an interest rate process would be used to generate a set of future interest rate paths;
Chen and Yang (1995) discuss several possible ways of doing this. Second, a weighted average
of future mortgage payments would be calculated using the hazard rate for each interest rate
scenario; the interest rate scenario would also determine the appropriate rate at which to discount
the cash flows. Finally, the simple average of the weighted average calculations for all interest
rate scenarios would equal the estimate of the price of the mortgage for a given interest rate
scenario. A pricing model based upon such hazard rate calculations would be a substantial
improvement over the simple rule of thumb approach used above because it reflects the
asymmetric response of the prepayments to interest rate changes.
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Concluding Remarks
This study reports on the determinants of the prepayment of multifamily mortgages on the
borrower’s decision to prepay. A special effort is made to incorporate the effects of unobservable
factors on the decision to refinance. The results indicate that the effect of the unobservables on
the prepayment decision is significant, even after conditioning on seasonality, the effects of the
1986 TRA, and relevant financial variables, as evidenced by the large upward revisions in
parameter estimates that result from the explicit incorporation of the unobservables.
The results are relevant to an ongoing debate regarding the ruthlessness with which
borrowers use the refinancing privilege to benefit from lower interest rates. Quigley and Van
Order (1990) cast doubt on the pure or ruthless version of the option pricing model for single
family mortgage borrowers; such borrowers appear to refinance more slowly than the ruthless
version of the model predicts. Our approach hopes to shed further light on this issue by focusing
on mortgages held by investors with presumably greater financial acumen and fewer reasons to
move for non-financial reasons and by taking account of unobserved heterogeneity. Surprisingly,
our results are consistent with the single family analysis of Quigley and Van Order. Prepayment
rates among multifamily mortgages surely respond positively to declines in the market rate of
interest; however, estimated and observed hazard rates are much lower than would be predicted
by the ruthless option pricing model.
Given the paucity of studies on the topic, more study of the prepayment and default
behavior is needed before one can conclude that investors in multifamily properties behave
suboptimally. A priority for further research should be the estimation of prepayment and default
behavior for other data sets and other time periods. In addition, the model of prepayment should
be expanded to include the influence of factors other than debt-cost minimization. One
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potentially important factor is the investor’s desire to rearrange his or her portfolio; unfortunately,
data are unavailable to incorporate this factor into our analysis. Furthermore, investors may churn
or turn over their properties in order to take maximum advantage of tax depreciation rules (see
Hendershott and Ling 1984)). Our analysis finds only modest support for a tax generated
turnover impact in the fourth quarter of 1986, but more investigation may be useful.
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Table 1: Loan Origination Statisticsa
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Loan Size
220099
253337
553930
341777
285502
151052
154123
832021
1066937
381182
1135808

Note Rate
9.45
9.43
9.50
10.26
11.64
12.97
14.87
13.61
14.16
10.74
11.02

a

Appraised Value
298468
344558
792975
472680
397696
254183
240800
1383313
2877875
772386
2722739

Number
245
362
67
57
61
30
2
135
8
43
73

The columns represent within year means. The sample does not contain any loans originated in 1981.
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Table 2: Models with Relative Prepayment Option Value

Model I
(without Heterogeneity)

(0)
(18)
(36)
(55)
Spring
Summer
Fall
1986 Q4
Prepayment Option

Coefficient

Standard Error

-6.363
-3.781
-2.531
-1.952
-0.238
-0.466
0.225
0.338
9.146

1.004
0.425
0.288
1.013
0.147
0.160
0.143
0.208
0.437

2

Log Likelihood

-2039.320
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Model II
(with Heterogeneity)
Coefficient
-6.156
-3.136
-1.831
-0.765
-0.326
-0.587
0.183
0.218
11.271
1.411
-2032.043

Standard Error
1.007
0.478
0.364
1.115
0.152
0.167
0.145
0.214
0.814
0.494

Table 3: Models with Positive Relative Prepayment Option Value

Model III
(without Heterogeneity)
(0)
(18)
(36)
(55)
Spring
Summer
Fall
1986 Q4
Positive Prepayment Option

Coefficient
-7.542
-5.694
-4.294
-3.318
-0.066
-0.251
0.243
0.507
2.811

Standard Error
1.006
0.427
0.286
1.011
0.146
0.159
0.143
0.210
0.125

2

Log Likelihood

-2081.872
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Model IV
( with Heterogeneity)
Coefficient
Standard Error
-7.695
1.011
-5.729
0.433
-4.084
0.302
-2.854
1.046
-0.088
0.148
-0.284
0.161
0.214
0.145
0.438
0.214
3.201
0.208
0.667
0.317
-2077.981

Table 4: Models with Spline for Relative Prepayment Option Value

Model V
(without Heterogeniety)
(0)
(18)
(36)
(55)
Spring
Summer
Fall
1986 Q4
Option Spline
Option 0.1
Option 0.0 to 0.1
Option -0.1 to 0.0
Option -0.1

Coefficient
-6.647
-4.662
-3.005
-2.428
-0.201
-0.436
0.200
0.330

Standard Error
1.019
0.497
0.345
1.047
0.148
0.162
0.144
0.211

Coefficient
-6.368
-4.098
-2.380
-1.274
-0.292
-0.552
0.173
0.249

Standard Error
1.027
0.568
0.427
1.156
0.153
0.168
0.145
0.215

5.815
20.443
5.609
6.269

1.914
3.088
2.776
1.336

9.536
21.733
9.005
6.916
1.184

2.726
3.616
3.335
1.510
0.448

2

Log Likelihood

Model VI
(with Heterogeniety)

-2031.198
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-2024.794

Table 5: Models with Indicators for Relative Prepayment Option Value

Model VII
(without Heterogeneity)
(0)
(18)
(36)
(55)
Spring
Summer
Fall
1986 Q4
Option Indicators
Option 0.1
Option 0.0 to 0.1
Option -0.1 to 0.0

Coefficient
-7.524
-6.115
-4.144
-3.192
-0.193
-0.419
0.203
0.420

Standard Error
1.010
0.437
0.285
1.011
0.148
0.162
0.145
0.213

Coefficient
-7.590
-6.107
-3.990
-2.697
-0.237
-0.482
0.191
0.376

Standard Error
1.012
0.448
0.294
1.052
0.150
0.165
0.146
0.216

3.741
2.102
0.409

0.164
0.191
0.133

4.241
2.456
0.483
0.704

0.273
0.260
0.144
0.349

2

Log Likelihood

Model VIII
(with Heterogeneity)

-2040.987

-2044.730

-28-

Table 6: Models with Option Spline, Log Book Value and Housing
Model IX
(without Heterogeneity)
(0)
(18)
(36)
(55)
Spring
Summer
Fall
1986 Q4
Option Spline
Option 0.1
Option 0.0 to 0.1
Option -0.1 to 0.0
Option -0.1
Log Book Value
Log Housing Value

Coefficient
-6.632
-4.696
-2.952
-2.399
-0.209
-0.443
0.191
0.318

Standard Error
1.023
0.506
0.360
1.053
0.148
0.162
0.144
0.211

1.947
3.403
2.985
1.349
0.260
0.249

5.188
20.968
5.730
6.587
-0.072
0.327

Model X
(with Heterogeneity)
Coefficient
-6.437
-4.196
-2.371
-1.265
-0.296
-0.559
0.160
0.232

Standard Error
1.031
0.574
0.427
1.152
0.152
0.168
0.145
0.216

8.747
20.807
8.588
7.316
-0.418
0.809

2

Log Likelihood

-2026.184

-2018.977
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2.789
3.985
3.466
1.532
0.364
0.388

Hazard Rates w and w/o Heterogeneity
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Endnotes
1.

In fact, the maximal observation period across mortgages spanned 56 quarters and under
ideal conditions we would have had 56 baseline parameters to estimate. However, no
mortgage in its 25th quarter was prepaid and we could not estimate a baseline parameter
for this quarter independent of the other estimates. We decided on a smoothed estimate
for this quarter, setting it equal to the simple mean of the 24th and 26th quarter estimates.

2.

A call option on a share of stock allows its owner to purchase a share of a stock at a
specified (exercise) price on or before a particular (exercise) date. The call option is said
to be in the money if the market price exceeds the exercise price, because the owner of the
option can earn a profit by exercising the option; a call option which is not in the money is
said to be out of the money. The prepayment option can also be characterized as a call
option because the borrower has the opportunity to buy his or her mortgage from the bank
at its book or par value prior to maturity. Ignoring transactions costs for the moment, the
prepayment option is in the money whenever the current mortgage interest rate moves
below the contract rate because the borrower will realize savings by refinancing the
mortgage.

3.

Richard and Roll (1989) argue that interest rate volatility, an important component of
option values, is impounded into the rate on newly originated mortgages. They point out
that the logarithm of mortgage rates is well approximated as a linear function of the yield
on a ten-year treasury bond and the logarithm of interest rate volatility. Higher levels of
interest rate volatility lead to lower market values for the callable mortgage, reflecting a
higher value of Vc(t).

4.

Indices for multifamily housing prices are unavailable.

5.

Freddie Mac’s Plan B program, which began in the early 1980s and features a yield
maintenance prepayment penalty for the first five years of the mortgage. This penalty
completely eliminates any benefits of exercising the prepayment option during these five
years. For this reason, Plan B loans were not included in the sample.

6.

The calculated hazard rates in Figure 1 are computed using the estimates from Models IX
and X of Table 6. All covariates as well asEXOPT in the spline are set equal to zero.
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